# Anthro 1NC Shell

**First are the Links:**

Despite the attempts of the 1AC to prioritize the environmental protection over resource extraction the 1AC is just a continuation of existing anthropocentric mindsets because the act of valuing nature for the benefit of humans merely further entrenches the domination. It makes the environment and its inhabitants instrumentally valuable, instead of recognizing nature as valuable in itself. The absence of nature is in itself anthropocentric. **Yeuk-Sze** explains,

Suppose that putting out natural fires, culling feral animals or destroying some individual members of overpopulated indigenous species is necessary for the protection of the integrity of a certain ecosystem. Will these actions be morally permissible or even required? Is it morally acceptable for farmers in non-industrial countries to practise slash and burn techniques to clear areas for agriculture? Consider a mining company which has performed open pit mining in some previously unspoiled area. Does the company have a moral obligation to restore the landform and surface ecology? And **[W]hat is the value of a humanly** restored environment **compared with the** originally natural **environment?** It is often said to be morally wrong for human beings to pollute and destroy parts of the natural environment and to consume a huge proportion of the planet's natural resources. If that is wrong, is it simply because a sustainable environment is essential to (present and future) human well-being? Or is such behaviour also wrong because the natural environment and/or its various contents have certain values in their own right so that these values ought to be respected and protected in any case? These are among the questions investigated by environmental ethics. Some of them are specific questions faced by individuals in particular circumstances, while others are more global questions faced by groups and communities. Yet others are more abstract questions concerning the value and moral standing of the natural environment and its nonhuman components. In the literature on environmental ethics **the distinction between instrumental value and intrinsic value** (meaning “non-instrumental value”) **has been of considerable importance.** The former is the value of things as means to further some other ends, whereas **the latter [being]** is **the value of things as ends in themselves** regardless of whether they are also useful as means to other ends. For instance, certain fruits have instrumental value for bats who feed on them, since feeding on the fruits is a means to survival for the bats. However, it is not widely agreed that fruits have value as ends in themselves. We can likewise think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to acquire knowledge. Yet, in addition to any such value, it is normally said that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value, i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects for serving the ends of others. For another example, a certain wild plant may have instrumental value because it provides the ingredients for some medicine or as an aesthetic object for human observers. But if the plant also has some value in itself independently of its prospects for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plant also has intrinsic value. **Because the intrinsically valuable is** that which is **good as an end in itself, [the]** it is commonly agreed that something's possession of intrinsic **value generates a** prima facie **direct moral duty** on the part of moral agents **to protect it** or at least refrain from damaging it (see O'Neil 1992 and Jameson 2002 for detailed accounts of intrinsic value). **Many traditional western ethical perspectives**, however, **are anthropocentric or human-centered [as]** in that either **they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone** (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a strong sense) **or they assign a significantly greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings** than to any nonhuman things such that the protection or promotion of human interests or well-being at the expense of nonhuman things turns out to be nearly always justified (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a weak sense). For example, Aristotle (Politics, Bk. 1, Ch. 8) maintains that “nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man” and that the value of nonhuman things in nature is merely instrumental. Generally, **anthropocentric positions find it problematic to articulate what is wrong with the cruel treatment [the]** of **nonhuman** animals, **except to the extent that [it]** such treatment **may lead to** **bad** consequences for human[s] beings. Immanuel Kant (“Duties to Animals and Spirits”, in Lectures on Ethics), for instance, suggests that cruelty towards a dog might encourage a person to develop a character which would be desensitized to cruelty towards humans. From this standpoint, cruelty towards nonhuman animals would be instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, wrong. Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes some non-intrinsic wrongness of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) environmental devastation. Such destruction might damage the well-being of human beings now and in the future, since our well-being is essentially dependent on a sustainable environment (see Passmore 1974, Bookchin 1990, Norton, Hutchins, Stevens, and Maple (eds.) 1995). When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of philosophy in the early 1970s, it did so by posing a challenge to traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it questioned the assumed moral superiority of human beings [and] to members of other species on earth. In the second place, it investigated the possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to the natural environment and its nonhuman contents. It should be noted, however, that some theorists working in the field see no need to develop new, non-anthropocentric theories. Instead, they advocate what may be called enlightened anthropocentrism (or, perhaps more appropriately called, prudential anthropocentrism). Briefly, this is the view that all the moral duties we have towards the environment are derived from our direct duties to its human inhabitants. The practical purpose of environmental ethics, they maintain, is to provide moral grounds for social policies aimed at protecting the earth's environment and remedying environmental degradation. Enlightened anthropocentrism, they argue, is sufficient for that practical purpose, and perhaps even more effective in delivering pragmatic outcomes, in terms of policy-making, than non-anthropocentric theories given the theoretical burden on the latter to provide sound arguments for its more radical view that the nonhuman environment has intrinsic value (cf. Norton 1991, de Shalit 1994, Light and Katz 1996). [[1]](#footnote-1)

**Second are the Impacts:**

**A.** Anthropocentrism is epistemically suspect – including other perspectives and points of reference is uniquely key to forming a cogent basis for our knowledge. This implies that the critique comes prior to aff framework since we need a stable epistemology to form normative truths and discern between right and wrong. **Das** explains,

Parallax describes the apparent change in the direction of a moving object caused by alteration in the observer's position. In the graphic work of M.C. Escher, human faculties are similarly deceived and an impossible reality made plausible. While not strictly a scientific theorem, anthropocentrism, the assessment of reality through an exclusively human perspective, is deeply embedded in science and culture. **Improving knowledge requires abandoning anthropocentricity** or, at least, acknowledging its existence. **Anthropocentrism's limits derive from the** physical **constraints of human cognition** and specific psychological attitudes. **Being human entails specific faculties**, intrinsic attitudes, values and belief systems **that shape** enquiry and **understanding**. The human mind has evolved a specific physical structure and bio-chemistry that shapes thought processes. The human cognitive system determines our reasoning and therefore our knowledge. Language, logic, mathematics, abstract thought, cultural beliefs, history and memories create a specific human frame of reference, which may restrict what we can know or understand. There may be other forms of life and intelligence. The ocean has revealed creatures that live from chemo-synthesis in ecosystems around deep-sea hydrothermal vents, without access to sunlight. Life forms based on materials other than carbon may also be feasible. An entirely radical set of cognitive frameworks and alternative knowledge cannot be discounted. Like a train that can only run on tracks that determine direction and destination, human knowledge may ultimately be constrained by what evolution has made us. Knowledge was originally driven by the need to master the natural environment to meet basic biological needs—survival and genetic propagation. It was also needed to deal with the unknown and forces beyond human control. Superstition, religion, science and other belief systems evolved to meets these human needs. In the eighteenth century, medieval systems of aristocratic and religious authority were supplanted by a new model of scientific method, rational discourse, personal liberty and individual responsibility. But this did not change the basic underlying drivers. **Knowledge is** also **influenced by human** factors—fear and **greed, ambition,** submission and tribal collusion, altruism and **jealousy, as well as complex power relationships** and inter-personal group dynamics. Behavioural science illustrates the inherent biases in human thought. Announcing a boycott of certain "luxury" scientific journals, 2013 Nobel laureate Dr. Randy Schekman argued that to preserve their pre-eminence they acted like "fashion designers who create limited-edition handbags or suits…knowing scarcity stokes demand". He argued that science is being distorted by perverse incentives whereby scientists who publish in important journals with a high "impact factor" can expect promotion, pay rises and professional accolades. Understanding operates within these biological and attitudinal constraints. As Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: "every philosophy hides a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding place, every word is a mask". Understanding of fundamental issues remains limited. The cosmological nature and origins of the universe are contested. **The physical source** and nature **of matter** and energy **are debated. The** origins and **evolution of biological life remain unresolved**. Resistance to new ideas frequently restricts the development of knowledge. The history of science is a succession of controversies—a non geo-centric universe, continental drift, theory of evolution, quantum mechanics and climate change. Science, paradoxically, seems to also have inbuilt limits. Like an inexhaustible Russian doll, quantum physics is an endless succession of seemingly infinitely divisible particles. Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle posits that human knowledge about the world is always incomplete, uncertain and highly contingent. Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems of mathematical logic establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems of arithmetic. Experimental methodology and testing is flawed. Model predictions are often unsatisfactory. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb observed: "You can disguise charlatanism under the weight of equations … there is no such thing as a controlled experiment." **Challenging anthropocentrism does not mean abandoning** science or **rational thought. It** does not mean reversion to primitive religious dogma, messianic phantasms or obscure mysticism. Transcending anthropocentricity **may allow new frames of reference expanding the boundary of** human **knowledge. It may allow** **human beings to** think more clearly, **consider different perspectives** and encourage possibilities outside the normal range of experience and thought. **It may also allow a greater understanding of our** existential **place within nature** and in the order of things. As William Shakespeare's Hamlet cautioned a friend: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy". But fundamental biology may not allow the required change of reference framework. While periodically humbled by the universe, **human beings remain enamoured**, for the most part, **with** the proposition that they are the apogee of **development**. **But** as Mark Twain observed in Letters from Earth: "He took a pride in man; man was his finest invention; man was his pet, after the housefly." Writing in The Hitchhikers' Guide to the Galaxy, the late English author Douglas Adams speculated that the earth was a powerful computer and human beings were its biological components designed by hyper-intelligent pan-dimensional beings to answer the ultimate questions about the universe and life. To date, science has not produced a conclusive refutation of this whimsical proposition. Whether or not we can go beyond **anthropocentrism**, it **is a reminder of our limits**. As Martin Rees, Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, at Cambridge and Astronomer Royal, noted:  "Most educated people are aware that we are the outcome of nearly 4 billion years of Darwinian selection, but many tend to think that humans are somehow the culmination. Our sun, however, is less than halfway through its lifespan. It will not be humans who watch the sun's demise, 6 billion years from now. Any creatures that then exist will be as different from us as we are from bacteria or amoebae."

**B.** Anthropocentrism is the original and foundational hierarchy that structures all other forms of oppression. Without the domination of animal’s humans would have never developed the technologies to oppress all life considered to be lesser than human – it is the controlling impact. **Best** explains,

**Hierarchy emerged [when]** with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, **humans began to establish** their **dominance** **over animals through** “domestication.” In animal **domestication** (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. **As they gained** increasing **control** over the lives and labor power of animals, **humans bred them for desired traits** and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. **To** conquer, **enslave**, and claim **animals as their own property, humans developed** numerous technologies, such as pens, **cages**, collars, ropes, **chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans**. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, **when Europeans began** the **colonization** of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, **the** metaphors, **models, and technologies used to exploit animal[s]** slaves **were applied with equal cruelty** and force **to** human **slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment** and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, **wrapping chains around** slaves’ bodies, shipping **them** in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, **branding their skin** with a hot iron **to mark them as property,** auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – **all these horrors** and countless others inflicted on black slaves **were developed** and perfected centuries earlier **through animal exploitation**. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that **the domination of human** over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically **begins with the denigration of victims.**

**C.** Anthropocentrism results in both the extinction of life on Earth, but also our ontological death – it corrupts and bankrupts our relationships with the natural world while also making ecocide inevitable. The kritik holds the internal link to aff solvency, as it’s impossible to protect the environment with an anthropocentric mindset. **Gottlieb** explains,

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. **Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned** and **not** just **because** we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, **skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources**. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. **Our uncaring violence also** violates **the very ground of our being**, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, **we have crucified ourselves**-in-relation-to-the-other, **fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived** as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. **The other which is nonhuman nature is** not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is **inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take**, every bit of food we eat, **every glass of water we drink**. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. **It is precisely our** sense of **belonging to nature** as system, as interaction, as interdependence, **which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide**. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. **Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time**, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) **For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood**, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. **Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals** and furthers **the continuing dance of interdependence**. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And **this is not,** contrary to Levinas's fear, **reducing the other to the same, but a** celebration of a larger, **more inclusive**, and still complex and **articulated self**.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, **we are**, quite simply, **all in it together.** And, **although this new ecological Holocaust** -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – **is under way, it is not yet final.** We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. **But only if we see that world** not as an other across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but **as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love**; neither for our selves nor for the other, but **for us all.** [[2]](#footnote-2)

Ontological death outweighs aff impacts because it symbolizes the destruction the basis for our very being and thusly, our moral agency. By killing nature we mine as well be killing ourselves because we fail to recognize that humanity is not distinct from nature, but rather, interdependent with it.

**Third** **is the Alternative:**

The alternative is to embrace a form of deep ecology that proscribes a radical break away from the humanist mindsets by developing countries that justify anthropocentrism. Only the radical suicide of ecological distinctions between the human and non-human solves. **Nash** explains,

Karl Marx, of course, had studied this last form of hierarchy and proposed a revolutionary remedy. Bookchin began where Marx stopped. He recommended **[D]iscarding ecological** as well as economic class **distinctions** along with the governments that sanctioned and sustained them. This **meant revolution** and, here again, Bookchin transcended Marx. The nineteenth-century revolutionary called for a government of and by the working class; Bookchin wanted no government at all. His objective was **not to seize power** for one group or another **but to dissolve  it entirely as an apparatus by which people related** to each other and, as a species, **to nature**. As early as 1965 Bookchin linked anarchism and **ecology**. Both. perspectives, he believed, stressed the equal value of every part of the community and the **necessit[ates]**y of maximizing individual freedom so that every component could fulfill its potential. "I submit," Bookchin wrote in "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought" (1965), "that an anarchist [the] community would approximate a normal ecosystem; it would be diversified, balanced and harmonious." 6 The means to this end, he explained in his major work, The Ecology of Freedom (1982), was through an "ethics of complementarity" derived from an "ecological vision of nature." Bookchin's utopia was not only based on ecological models; it included the ecosystem. He sought [in]a "new and lasting equilibrium with nature" just as he did with other humans. Bookchin was under no illusion about the fact that his ecoanarchism necessitated the wholesale **replacement of** his **civilization's "institutional and ethical framework.**” He also knew that this was another word for revolution. "I would like to ask," he wrote in 1974, "if **the environmental crisis [has]** does not have **its roots in the very constitution of society** as we know it today, if **the changes that are needed**.., do not **require a fundamental**, indeed revolutionary, **reconstitution of society along ecological lines**?" 9 It was from this perspective that Bookchin, like the deep ecologists whom he anticipated, criticized most manifestations of American conservation and even large parts of modern environmentalism. As one of the first of the radical environmentalists, and as an avowed revolutionary, Book-chin remained profoundly suspicious of those who would save the world by banning aerosol cans or staging Earth-Day cleanups. He regretted that by 1980 "ecology is now fashionable, indeed faddish--and with this sleazy popularity has emerged a new type of environmentalist hype' campaigns but did not challenge the mental pollution that Bookchin regarded as the root of the problem. Dismissing charges that environmentalist demands were too radical, he argued "they are not radical enough." Specifically, Bookchin continued, "'**environmentalism' does not** bring into **question the underlying notion** of the present society **that man must dominate nature; it** seeks to **facilitate[s] domination by** developing techniques for **diminishing the hazards caused by domination.**” **The only** meaningful, long-term **solution:** was to **replace the modern world's "odious morality**" **with a** holistic, **environmental ethic that had as its basis respect for all** people and all **nature**. Armed with **new definitions of right and wrong [will]**, ecoanarchists could **tear down the old order and erect the new**.

The permutation always fails; half-hearted measures to reject anthropocentrism are nonsensical since they require one to still allow for a human-centric mindset, which is in itself a manifestation of the ideology. Only by having a radical revolution against anthropocentric mindsets solves – my evidence is comparative. **Best 2** explains,

Revolutionary environmentalism is based on the realization that **[P]olitics as usual just won’t cut it anymore. We will always lose if we play by their rules rather than invent new forms of struggle**, new social movements, and new sensibilities. **The defense of the earth requires immediate and decisive**: logging roads need to be blocked, driftnets need to be cut, and cages need to be emptied. But these are defensive actions, and in addition to these tactics, **radical movements** and alliances must be built from the perspective total liberation. **A new revolutionary politics will build on the achievements of democratic**, libertarian socialist, and anarchist **traditions**. It will incorporate radical green, feminist, and indigenous struggles. **It will merge animal, earth, and human standpoints in** a total **liberation** struggle **against** global capitalism and its **omnicidal grow-or-die logic**. **Radical politics must reverse the growing power of the state,** mass media, and corporations **to promote egalitarianism** and participatory democratization **at all levels** of society – political, cultural, and economic. **It must dismantle all asymmetrical power relations** and structures of hierarchy**, including that of humans over** animals and **the earth. Radical politics is impossible without the** revitalization of citizenship and the **re-politicization of life, which begins with forms of education,** communication, culture, **and art that** anger, awaken, inspire, and **empower people toward action and change**.

**Fourth is Framework:**

**A.** Because the ballot gives the judge the power to determine what is endorsed as truthful in this round, the judge is implicitly assuming the role of the intellectual, which by definition means that their primary obligation is to reflect on and deconstruct truth. **Foucault** explains,

It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in **[T]he intellectual is not the ‘bearer of universal values.’** **Rather**, it’s **the person** occupying a specific position – but **who**se specificity **is linked**, in a society like ours, **to** the general functioning of an apparatus of **truth**. In other words, the intellectual has a three-fold specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty-bourgeois in the service of capitalism or ‘organic’ intellectual of the proletariat); that of his conditions of life and work, linked to his condition as an intellectual (his field of research, his place in a laboratory, and political and economy demands to which he submits of against which he rebels, in the university, the hospital, etc.); lastly, the specificity of the politics of truths in our societies. And **it’s with this** last **factor that [their]** his **position can take on** a general **significance** and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectorial. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society. **There is a battle** ‘for truth,’ or at least ‘**around truth’** – it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf’ of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth **and the** economic and political **role it plays**. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of ‘science’ and ‘ideology’, but in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘power’. And thus the question of the professionalization of intellectuals and the division between intellectual and manual labour can be envisaged in a new way. All this must seem very confused and uncertain. Uncertain indeed, and what I am saying here is above all to be taken as a hypothesis. In order for it to be a little less confused, however, I would like to put forward a few ‘propositions’ – not firm assertions, but simply suggestions to be further tested and explained. **‘Truth’ is** to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is **linked** in a circular relation **with** system of **powers which** produces and **sustain** it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. **A regime** of truth. This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it’s this same regime **which [is], subject to** certain **modifications**, operates in the socialists countries (I leave open here the question of China, about which I know little). **The** essential political problem for the **intellectual** **is not to criticize** the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or **to ensure that his own** scientific **practice** is accompanied by a correct ideology, **but** **that of ascertaining the possibility of** constitution a **new** politics of **truth. The problem is** not changing people’s consciousness’s – or what’s in their heads – but **the** political, economic, institutional regime of the **production of truth**. **It’s** not **a matter** of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but **of detaching the power of truth from** the forms of **hegemony**, social economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.

**B.** Engaging in a deconstructive thought is a pre-requisite to all other forms of thought because asymmetrical power relations corrupt the meaning of truth. Rather than act as a judgment, truth must combat judgment to have a cogent and valuable meaning. **Deleuze[[3]](#footnote-3)** explains,

Combat is not a judgment of God, but the way to have done with God and with judgment. **No one develops through** **judgment, but through a combat that implies no judgment**. Existence and judgment seem to be opposed on five points: cruelty versus infinite torture, sleep or intoxication versus the dream, vitality versus organization, the will to power versus a will to dominate, combat versus war. What disturbed us was that in renouncing judgment we had the impression of depriving ourselves of any means of distinguishing between existing beings, between modes of existence, as if everything were now of equal value. But is it not rather **[J]udgment** that **presupposes preexisting criteria** (higher values), criteria that preexist for all time (to the infinity of time), **so** **that it can neither apprehend what is new** in an existing being, **nor** even **sense** **the creation of a mode of existence?** Such a mode is created vitally, through combat, in the insomnia of sleep, and not without a certain cruelty toward itself: nothing of all this is the result of judgment. **Judgment prevents the emergence of any new modes of existence. For** the latter **creates itself through its own forces**, that is, through the forces it is able to harness, **and is valid in and of itself** inasmuch as it brings the new combination into existence. Herein, perhaps, lies the secret: to bring into existence and not to judge. If **it so disgusting to judge**, it is **not because everything is of equal value, but** on the contrary **because what has value can be** made or **distinguished only by defying judgment. What expert judgment, in art, could ever bear on the work to come?**  It is not a question of judging other existing beings, but of sensing whether they agree or disagree with us, that is, whether they bring forces to us, or whether they return us to the miseries of war, to the poverty of thee dream, to the rigors of organization. As Spinoza had said, it is a problem of love and hate and not judgment; “my soul and body are one...What my soul loves, I love. What my soul hates, I hate...All the subtle sympathizing’s of the incalculable soul, from the bitterest that to passionate love.” This is not subjectivism, since to pose the problem in terms of force, and not in other terms, already surpasses all subjectivity.

## 2NR Overview

Extend Yeut-Sze – the 1AC’s attempts to protect the environment are a façade for the anthropocentric mindsets that justify the domination of the human over the nonhuman because the protecting the environment for human needs is treating the environment as instrumentally valuable, rather than intrinsically valuable. The cruel treatment of animals is wrong not because animals suffer but because such treatment results in a damaged human ecosystem. The absence of the animal is the presence of anthropocentrism.

Extend Das – anthropocentrism is epistemically suspect, because it fails to include other perspectives and points of reference in its knowledge formulation. Human knowledge is corrupted through our desires, ambition, as well as our complex power relations. Removing the anthropocentric mindset allows humans to consider the how our knowledge formulation and practices affect other beings, which is necessary to verify our knowledge. Epistemology comes prior to other normative constructs because we need to know how we know what we know before we have the ability to discern between right and wrong.

Extend Best – anthropocentrism is the original and foundational hierarchy that structures and results in all other forms of oppression. Without the domination of animal’s humans would have never developed the technologies to oppress all life considered being lesser than human – it is the controlling impact.

Extend Gottlieb – anthropocentrism results in both the extinction of life on Earth, but also our ontological death – it corrupts and bankrupts our relationships with the natural world while also making ecocide inevitable. Humans have fractured their ontological being, severing their relationship with nature, which is just as much a part of our humanity as anything else – this is evident with every breath we take. Ecocide kills us both physically and ontologically. This means that I hold the internal link to aff solvency because it’s impossible to protect the environment while endorsing anthropocentrism.

Extend Nash – the alternative is to embrace a form of deep ecology that proscribes a radical break away from the humanist mindsets by developing countries that justify anthropocentrism. Only the radical suicide of the ecological distinctions between the human and non-human solves. Half-hearted measures to reject anthropocentrism are nonsensical since they require one to still allow for a human-centric mindset, which is in itself a manifestation of the ideology. Only this radical rejection of anthropocentrism removes the distinctions that result in the mindset. Even if the alt fails the status quo isn’t an option – the K is a disad to the aff and straight turns their links because it proves they are merely replicating the harms that they criticize.

Extend Best 2 – only a radical revolution against anthropocentrism solves; we will only lose if we continue to play their rules, we will always lose. Radical revolutions are able to invent new forms of struggle in order to resist society and it’s corruptive ideologies by dismantling asymmetrical power relations. Prefer this evidence because it’s directly comparative.

## Link – Kant

Kantian theory justifies ruthless anthropocentrism by basing unconditional value in the rationality of humans, as well as justifies endless environmental exploitation – turns case. **Wood[[4]](#footnote-4)** explains,

**Kant’s** ethical **theory is famously** (or notoriously) **anthropocentric** -- or rather, it is *logocentric,* by which I mean that **it is based on the idea that rational nature,** and it alone, **has** absolute and **unconditional value**. Kant takes the authority of the moral law to be grounded in the fact that it is legislated by rational will. **The** **fundamental end** whose value grounds the theory **is the dignity of rational nature, and** its command is always **to treat humanity as an end in itself.**  Here **the term ‘humanity’** **is** being **used** in a technical sense, **to refer to the capacity to set ends according to reason.** It includes the *technical* predisposition to devise means to arbitrary ends, and the *pragmatic* predisposition to unite our ends into a comprehensive whole, called ‘happiness’. ‘Humanity’ is one of the three original predispositions of our nature, along with ‘animality’, which includes our instinctual desires promoting our survival, reproduction and sociability, and ‘personality’ which is our rational capacity to give moral laws and obey them (R 6:26, VA 7:321-324).[[5]](#endnote-1) ‘Humanity’ in this sense does not refer to membership in any particular biological species. (As a matter of fact, Kant thought it quite likely that there are rational beings on other planets; they would be ends in themselves every bit as much as human beings (in the nontechnical sense)(AN 1:351-368).) Even so, it might seem as though **a theory of this kind** would license (or even **require[s])** **a** ruthlessly **exploitative attitude toward** humanity’s natural environment and **all nonhuman things** in it. For **if rational nature is the only end** in itself, **then everything else must count only as a means to rational** nature and its **ends.** Nothing else could have a worth which might set limits on those ends or on the ways in which rational beings might choose to employ nonrational nature in pursuit of them. Some of Kant’s own statements, moreover, appear to be shameless endorsements of this ghastly inference from his logocentric theory. In his explication of the Formula of Humanity as End in Itself, Kant distinguishes *persons* -- rational beings possessing the dignity of rational nature as an end in itself -- from *things,* which, he says, “have only a relative worth, while persons, and they alone, may not be used merely as means” (G 4:428). A similar thought is found at the opening of **Kant’s [states in his] lectures** on anthropology “**The fact that the human being can have the representation ‘I’ raises him** infinitely **above** all the other **beings** on earth. By this he is a *person*… that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from *things*, **such as irrational animals**, with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion” (VA 7:127). **And in his essay *Conjectural Beginning of Human History,* Kant** describes in the following words the sense of self-worth which our first parents acquired when they began to use reason and to reflect on the gulf which this marvelous new capacity put between them and the rest of creation: “The first time [the human being] said to the sheep, *Nature gave the skin you wear not for you but for me,* and then took it off the sheep and put it on himself (*Genesis* 3:21), he became aware of the prerogative he had by nature over all animals, which he **no longer saw [animals] as fellow creatures, but as means** and tools **at the disposal of his will** for the attainment of the aims at his discretion” (MA 8:114). Passages like these surely tend to confirm the view, which is widely held among (but not restricted to) animal’s rights advocates, proponents of ecological or ecofeminist ethics, and postmodernist critics of rationalism and humanism, that an ethical theory such as Kant’s is well-suited to promote those attitudes which have led to the monstrous destruction modern technological society has wrought on nature, and continues to wreak on it with increasing ferocity.

## Link – Pedagogy

The absence of the animal is the presence of anthropocentrism and their use of a critical pedagogy is a fundamentally inaccessible practice to the animal body and nature – their performance actualizes itself through mass violence against animals. **Bell and Russell[[6]](#footnote-5)** explain,

For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, [**T]he exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded** so far **with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature**. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), **nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence**. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. **The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence** and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of **anthropocentrism**, like examples of gender symbolization, **occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend,** beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. **Humans** alone, he¶ reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the¶ objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone **are able to infuse the world with their creative presence**, to overcome situations that limit them,¶ and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). **Freire** (1990, pp. 87–91) **represents** other **animals in terms of their lack of¶ such traits**.They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives¶ “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but¶ to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals¶ there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically¶ bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals¶ only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and¶ though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we¶ as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined¶ biological existence. Change in the **service of human freedom is seen to be¶ our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very¶ essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation,¶ wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy.¶ The human/animal opposition** upon which it rests **is taken for granted**, its¶ cultural and historical specificity **not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem.** Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness¶ from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and¶ communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al.,¶ 1991, p. 91). **This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and** like¶ other discourses of normalcy, it **limits possibilities of** taking up and **confronting inequities** (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of **the human enterprise is** simply **not questioned**.¶ Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature¶ of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be¶ passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the¶ relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any¶ sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and¶ other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to¶ environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn,¶ remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell,¶ & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE¶ Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root metaphors or “analogs” in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric¶ thinking. **These include** the notion of change as inherently progressive, faith in the power of rational thought, and **an understanding of individuals**¶ **as** “potentially **free**, voluntaristic **entities who will take responsibility for¶ creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppressio**n” (1993a,¶ pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlightenment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education¶ generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem¶ from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view¶ was beginning to take shape.¶ To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are¶ being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995;¶ Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main¶ point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront¶ the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs¶ and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social¶ progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the¶ expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of consumption? How is educating for freedom predicated on the exploitation of¶ the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, self, and community, and thus bring into focus the¶ underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical¶ pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’¶ interdependence with the more-than-human world.¶ This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. **Humans are assumed**¶ **to be** **free agents separate from** and pitted against the rest of **nature**, our¶ fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption¶ of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since¶ Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation¶ of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96).

## Impact – Politics

Before we can take action, we must first question and understand the power relations that allow oppression to come up. The critical interrogation of the anthropocentric machine is key to effective policy reform, which implies that the kritik comes before the aff. **McLaren[[7]](#footnote-6)** explains,

**Critical pedagogy needs to** hold a non-reductionist view of the social order: **to see society as an irreducible indeterminacy**. The social field is always open and we must explore its fissures, fault-lines, gaps, and silences. **Power relations** may not always have a conscious design, but they**have unintended consequences which define** deepstructural **aspects of oppression**, even though every ideological totalization of the social is designed to fail. This is not to affirm Schopenhauer’s unwilled patterns of history but rather to assert that while domination has a logic without design in its sign systems and social practices, **it** does [and operates] **operate[s]through overdetermined** **structures of** race, class, and gender **difference.** **Resistance**to such domination **means deconstructing** the social **by means of a reflexive intersubjective consciousness**-what Freire terms *conscientizacao.* With this comes a recognition that ideology is not just an epistemological concern about the status of certain facts, but the way in which discourse and discursive systems generate particular social relations as well as reflect them.A reflexive intersubjective consciousness is the beginning-but only the beginning-of revolutionary praxis **We**also **need to construct new narratives-**new “border narratives”-in order **to** **re-author the discourse**s **of oppression in politically subversive ways,** as well as create sites of possibility and enablement. For instance, we need to ask: How are our identities bound up with the historical forms of discursive practices? It is one thing to argue against attacks on polyvocal and unassimilable difference and on narrative closure or to stress the heterogeneity of contemporary culture. But in doing so we must remember that dominant discourses are sites of struggle[.] and their meanings are linked to social antagonisms and labor/economic relations, and naturalized in particular textual/linguistic referents. Consequently, **self-reflection**alone- even it is inimicably opposed to all forms of domination and oppression**-is**only **a necessary but not**nearly **sufficient condition for emancipation.** **This must go hand in hand with changes in** material and **social conditions through counterhegemonic action** (Hammer and Mclaren 1991). The socio-historical dynamic of race, clan, and gender domination must never be left out of the equation of social structure or take a back seat to the sociology seminar room. Common-sense consciousness is not enough. **We need a language of criticism as an antidote to the** a theoretical **use of “personal experience”** in advancing claims for emancipatory action. However, this [which] needs to be followed by the development of truly counterhegemonic public spheres. More than rhetorical displacements of oppression, we must have coordinated resistance to racist patriarchal capitalism and gender-divided labor relations. According to Teresa Eber, **what is needed is an intervention** into the system of patriarchal oppression **at both the** macro-political level of the **structural organization of domination** (a transformative politics of labor relations) **and the** micro-political **level of** different and contradictory manifestations of oppression **(cultural politics).**

## A2 – Cede the Political

The political is already ceded – the alternative solves best for political change and anthropocentrism. **Best[[8]](#footnote-7)** explains,

**If humanity is to survive** and flourish **in its precarious journey into the future, it needs a new moral compass** because anthropocentrism has failed us dramatically. Albert Schweitzer observed that “the problem with ethics so far is that they have been limited to a human-to-human consideration.” In place of the alienated and predatory sensibility of Western life, Schweitzer proposed a new code – an “ethic of reverence for life.” This entails a universal ethic of compassion and respect that includes all humanity, embraces non-human species, and extends to the entire earth. We need a “Declaration of Interdependence” to replace our outmoded “Declaration of Independence.” **The demand to cease exploiting animals and the earth is one and the same;** we cannot change in one area without changing in the other. Animal rights and **environmental ethics are the logical next stages in human moral evolution and the next necessary steps in the human** journey to enlightenment and wholeness. Sadly, on Earth Day, as on every other day, the human species continues to invade and damage the planet. As I write, I receive a report from Traffic, a British-based wildlife monitoring group, saying that because of deforestation and trading in its body parts, the Sumatran tiger, Indonesia's last tiger sub-species, is on the brink of extinction. In addition, I read that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service removed two tropical birds, the Mariana mallard and the Guam broadbill, from its endangered species list – not because they are safe but because they became extinct. In some way we cannot possibly grasp, the entire earth is trying to adjust to their inalterable absence. According to the cliché, “Every day is Earth Day.” Truth be told, every day is Human Growth Day. On April 22, the media might turn away from Michael Jackson or Bush’s terror war for a thirty second fluff piece on the state of the planet, and some individuals might pause for a moment to think about their environment. **Like the evil-doer who sins all week and then atones on Sunday, human beings plunder the planet all year long and stop for a moment of guilt and expiation.** We congratulate ourselves for honoring Earth Day, when in fact the very concept would be incoherent in an ecological society. In honor of Earth Day it is appropriate to ask: what does it mean to be an environmentalist? **Where industries, the state, and toxic nihilists of ever stripe want those who care about the environment to bear stigmas such as “kook,”** wacko,” “un-American,” and even “terrorist,” **being an environmentalist must become a badge of honor.** To be an environmentalist is to realize that one is not only a citizen of human society, one also is a citizen of the earth, an eco-citizen. **Our community includes not only our society with other human beings on a national and international scale, but also our relations** to the entire living earth, **to the biocommunity**. **We need to act like we are citizens and not conquering invaders.** We have not only a negative duty to avoid doing harm to the earth as much as possible, but also a positive duty to help nature regenerate.

# Subaltern 1NC Shell

The affirmative’s view of the other is flawed – something to be mapped yet radically unknowable – one that is dangerous but also alluring. Their call for the ballot is frightening – it transforms the ballot into a symbol of a prize of Otherness while erasing the subaltern. They view the subaltern through a critical lens while sitting comfortably in this air conditions simulacrum we call the debate round. This form of knowledge production is a façade of neutrality – it is instead the lynchpin of the Western intellectual subject. Any type of the argument the affirmative makes that claims the subaltern would be on board with their project relies on the same logic that reinforces conceptions of the inferior other. **Spivak[[9]](#footnote-8)** explains,

SOME OF THE most [**R]adical criticism coming out of the West** today **is the result of an interested desire to conserve the** subject of the West, or **the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while** often **providing a cover for this subject of knowledge**. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, **this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The** much publicized **critique of the sovereign subject** thus **actually inaugurates a Subject**. . . . **This** S/**subject**, curiously **sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side** of the international division of labor. **It is impossible for contemporary** French **intellectuals to imagine the** kind of **Power and Desire that would inhabit the** unnamed **subject of the Other** of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientiﬁc production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that **the intellectual is complicit in the** persistent **constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow**, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the ﬁnal determinant or the transcendental signiﬁed. **The clearest** available **example** of such epistemic violence **is the remotely orchestrated**, fareflung, and **heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This** project **is** also **the** asymetrical **obliteration of** the trace of **that Other** in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redeﬁnition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redeﬁnition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualiﬁed as inadequate to their task or insufﬁ- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientiﬁcity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. **We must now confront the following question**: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, **can the subaltern speak?** . . .

The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption as well as commodification of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust; voting aff doesn’t actually solve the Other’s problems. It just reinforces the fact that the West is still controlling the solutions to the problems of the subaltern – turns case. **Chow[[10]](#footnote-9)** explains,

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in **[T]he way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used**. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, **the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study** and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, **it produces a way of talking in which notions of** lack, **subalternity**, victimization and so forth **are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of** alterity and **political righteousness**. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. **Whether sincere or delusional,** such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. **What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import,** and thus **depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest** and rightful demand. **The oppressed**, whose voices we seldom hear, **are robbed twice - the first time of their** economic **chances, the second time of their language,** which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

The judge should vote negative to engage in academic exile – rather than examining structures external to this round, we should question our privilege to speak in the first place – our rejection of the academy is a precondition for any semblance of solvency – only the alternative solves. **Biwas[[11]](#footnote-10)** explains,

**Said** has written extensively and poignantly about his own exilic conditions as a Palestinian schooled in the Western literary canon and living in the heart of US empire.27 But more importantly, he **has** also **articulated exile as a ‘style of thought and habitation’** which makes possible certain kinds of ontological and epistemological openings. Speaking of exile as a ‘metaphorical condition’,28 Said describes it as ‘the state of never being fully adjusted’, of ‘always feeling outside’, of ‘restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others’, of ‘a kind of curmudgeonly disagreeableness’. **Exile**, he says, ‘**is the condition that characterizes the intellectual as someone who is** a marginal figure **outside the comforts of privilege**, power, being-at-homeness’.29 Not just ‘foreigners’ but ‘lifelong members of a society’, can be such ‘outsiders’, so that ‘(e)ven if one is not an actual immigrant or expatriate, it is still possible to think as one, to imagine and investigate in spite of barriers, and always to move away from the centralizing authorities towards the margins, where you see things that are usually lost on minds that have never traveled beyond the conventional and comfortable’.30 What Said privileges here is an intellectual orientation, rather than any identarian claims to knowledge; there is much to learn in that for IR scholars. In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans.31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The **state-centricity** of International Relations **has** not just **circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand** a vast ensemble of **globally oriented movements**, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination.32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts.33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. **For scholars of the global**, the (often unconscious) **hold** **of the nation-state** can be especially pernicious in the ways that it **limits** the scope and range of the **intellectual imagination**. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even **intellectuals** progressive on domestic issues **become collaborators of empire** when it comes to state actions abroad.34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own.35 It is fair to say that the jostling and unsettling of the nation-state that critical International Relations scholars have contributed to has still done little to dislodge the centrality of the nation-state in much of International Relations and Foreign Policy analyses. **Raising questions about the state-centricity of intellectual works becomes** even **more urgent in the** contemporary **context in which the hyperpatriotic surge** following the events of 11 September 2001 **has made** considerable **inroads into the** US **academy. The attempt to make the academy a place for** the **renewal of the nation-state** project **is troubling** **in itself**; for IR scholars in the US, such attempts can only limit the reach of a global sensibility precisely at a time when such globality is even more urgently needed. Said warns against the inward pull of patriotism in times of emergency and crisis, and argues that even for an intellectual who speaks for a particular cause, the task is to ‘universalize the crisis, to give greater human scope to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate that experience with the sufferings of others’.36 He is adamant that this is the case even for beleaguered groups such as the Palestinians whose very survival is dependent on formulating their demands in a nationalist idiom.37 American intellectuals, as members of a superpower with enormous global reach and where dissension in the public realm is noticeably absent, carry special responsibility in this regard.38 What **the exilic orientation makes possible** is **this ability to universalise by enabling** first, ‘**a double perspective that never sees things in isolation’** so that from the juxtaposition of ideas and experiences ‘**one gets** a better, perhaps even more universal idea of how to think, say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another’,39 and second, **an ability to see things** ‘not simply as they are, but **as they have come to be that way’**, as contingent ‘historical choices made by men and women’ that are changeable.40 **The second of these** abilities **displaces the ontological givenness of the nation-state in** the study of **global politics**; for the intellectual who feels pulled by the demands of loyalty and patriotism, Said suggests, ‘[n]ever solidarity before criticism’, arguing that it is the intellectual’s task to show how the nation ‘is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it’.41 The first of these abilities interjects a comparativist approach as critical to the study of global politics, locating one’s work in a temporal and spatial plane that is always larger than one’s immediate (national) context and in the process historicising and politicising what may appear naturalised in any particular (national) context. The now famous passage from Hugo of St Victor, cited by Auerbach, appears in Said’s writings on at least four different occasions: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his.

## 2NR Overview

Extend Spivak – the affirmative’s call for the ballot is frightening because it transforms the ballot into a symbol of the prize of Otherness while erasing the subaltern. The aff fails to account for their locational context when speaking on behalf of the Other, which diminishes their epistemic credibility. This form of knowledge production is not neutral; it is the lynchpin of the Western intellectual subject that assumes that the subaltern would be on board with their project. However, this relies on the same logic that reinforces the conception of an inferior other.

Extend Chow – speaking on behalf of the subaltern reduces it to a passive objet for the commodification of the debate community. An affirmative ballot doesn’t actually solve the Other’s problems; it just reinforces the fact that the West is still controlling the solutions to the problem of the subaltern – this turns the aff because they endorse the same mindsets that they criticize.

Extend Biwas – the alternative is for the judge to vote negative in an act of academic exile. Rather than examining structures external to this round, we should question our privilege to speak in the first place; our rejection of the Western academy is a precondition for any semblance of solvency. Only the alt solves because exile is the condition that characterizes the intellectual as someone who is outside the comforts of privilege.

## Link – Anthro

The idea that the affirmative can attempt to “end” anthropocentrism is self-defeating and links into the kritik because the position of being against anthropocentrism not only assumes we can speak for the animal outside our own reality but is also humanist – turns aff and links into K. **Morton[[12]](#footnote-11)** explains,

The deep green objection is that the parrots aren’t really animals and  that the film's view is anthropocentric. **Here** that **we run into one of the . ‘greatest obstacles to** the **ecological thought, the sign saying, “No anthropocentrism.” It's a dead end. The danger in [this]** political and philosophical **thinking is to reckon** that **we** have seen beyond ideology, that we **can stand out- side,** say, **“humanist” reality. This idea is itself humanism.** Anthropocentrism assumes an “anthro” that is “centric.” The problem resides not so much in the content as it does in the attitude that comes bundled with the accusation. **The idea of anthropocentrism is that the “human” occupies a privileged nonplace**, simultaneously within and outside the mesh. **One accuses others of anthropocentrism from that place.  Everything we think becomes suspect, as we assume that there is a Nature from which our thinking can deviate.** And deviancy must be punished. **The position of hunting for anthropocentrism is anthropocentrism. To claim that someone’s distinction of animals and humans is anthropocentric,** because she privileges reason over passion, **is to deny reason to nonhumans.** **We can’t in good faith cancel the difference** between humans and nonhumans. Nor can we preserve it. Doing both at the same time would be inconsistent. **We’re in a bind**. But don’t despair: kings felt less for peasants than they did for pheasants. The bind is a sign of an emerging democracy of life forms.

The alternative links into the critique too – the refusal to heed the voice of the nonhuman is the very same form of mastery they criticize. **Wapner[[13]](#footnote-12)** explains,

While **postmodern** cultural **critics** are comfortable giving voice to other people, they **stop short at the nonhuman world-the paradigmatic "other.**" When it comes to nature, postmodernists are happy to do all the talking. **They seem to see no need to heed the voice of the nonhuman**, no reason even to assume that, in the vast world of rivers, chimpanzees, rainstorms, and whales, anything is being said. Postmodern cultural critics look at the nonhuman world and think that they are looking in the mirror. There is nothing out there with its own authentic voice because, as soon as we imagine it expressing itself, we recognize that we are speaking, and therefore making up, its words. As Christopher Manes puts it, "It is as if we had compressed the entire buzzing, howling, gurgling biosphere into the narrow vocabulary of epistemology, to the point that someone like Georg Lukacs could say, 'nature is a societal category'-and actually be understood." THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. **Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery** that characterizes modernity. **But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own** conceptual **domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world?** What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature?

## A2 – Anthro K

**1.** The alternative inserts human judgment rather than human judgment in place of ecological interest, which merely reinscribes the anthropocentric mindset. **Bobertz[[14]](#footnote-13)** explains,

Apart from the political dangers Ferry associates with deep ecology, he believes the philosophy suffers from a fundamental self-contradiction. **The argument that natural objects can possess their own interests strikes Ferry as "one of the most absurd forms of anthro**pomorphism." n100 **We cannot "think like a mountain**," to use Aldo Leopold's famous phrase, n101 **because**, quite obviously, **we are not mountains.** Recalling Sierra Club v. Morton, n102 the famous standing case involving a proposal to construct a ski resort in California's Mineral King valley, Ferry claims that **environmentalists "always suppose that the interests of objects** (mountains, lakes and other natural things) **are opposed to development. But how do we know? After all, isn't it possible that Mineral King would be inclined to welcome a ski slope after having remained idle for millions of years?"** n103 Yet few people, including the writers Ferry labels as deep ecologists, would disagree with the fact that **recognizing value in natural objects is an act of human cognition**. Perhaps a person suffering from profound psychosis might claim the ability to understand how a mountain "thinks," but the writers Ferry criticizes do not advance 8540\*379 such bizarre claims. n104 For deep ecologists and environmental ethicists, phrases such as "think like a mountain" are metaphorical and heuristic, not literal and agenda-setting. According to Ferry, **a far graver problem with deep ecology lies in its appeal to those who might translate a nature-centered ideology into coercive political action. By promoting the idea that nature has intrinsic value, deep ecologists necessarily promote an antihuman,** antitechnology, and antimodern **worldview**, Ferry believes. If we assert that humans are merely "part" of the natural order, our position in that order must be a humble one:

**2.** Alternatives to anthropocentrism don’t seem to make sense because in order for us to show appreciation for other species we must employ a uniquely human rationale. **Grey[[15]](#footnote-14)** explains,

**The attempt to provide a genuinely non-anthropocentric set of values**, or preferences **seems to be a hopeless quest**. Once we eschew all human values, interests and preferences we are confronted with just too many alternatives, as we can see when we consider biological history over a billion year time scale. The problem with the various non-anthropocentric bases for value which have been proposed is that they permit too many different possibilities, not all of which are at all congenial to us. And that matters. We should be concerned to promote a rich, diverse and vibrant biosphere. Human flourishing may certainly be included as a legitimate part of such a flourishing. The preoccupations of deep ecology arise as a result of human activities which impoverish and degrade the quality of the planet's living systems. But **these judgments are possible only if we assume a set of values** (that is, preference rankings), **based on *human* preferences. We need to reject not anthropocentrism, but a particularly short term and narrow conception of human interests and concerns**. What's wrong with shallow views is not their concern about the well-being of humans, but that they do not really consider enough in what that well-being consists. **We need to develop an enriched, fortified anthropocentric notion of human interest to replace the dominant short-term, sectional and self-regarding conception.**

# Kritik Theory 1NC

**A.** Interpretation: the aff must allow the neg debater to negate by avenue other than proving that resource extraction should be prioritized over environmental protection.

**B.** Violation: the aff concedes in cross-ex that I need to prove the converse of the resolution, i.e., that extraction is to be prioritized over protection. This violation is also evident in the burden structure in the 1AC, which prevents me from running an argument that defend a specific alternative world, like a kritik.

**C.** Reason to Prefer: Forcing me to defend the status quo of resource extraction completely restricts my access to critical ground, which is dependent on specifying another world or alternative to the aff. Even if there are still a few possible options for me that still ignores the fact that when it comes to specifying alternatives, the burden on me restricts my ground. Likewise, such a burden structure precludes the possibility of me running a critique of the aff’s method of solvency, debate, or underpinnings of the resolution. There are two implications: (a) I hold the internal link to real world decision making because policies only make sense when they are implemented under a mindset, i.e., the idea of development is based on a human-centric, anthropocentric mindset; it’s impossible to access real world decision making without first debating the mindset behind it; and (b) criticism ground is holds the strongest internal link to education because the inherent role assumed by an intellectual is to deconstruct truth. **Foucault** explains,

It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in **[T]he intellectual is not the ‘bearer of universal values.’** **Rather**, it’s **the person** occupying a specific position – but **who**se specificity **is linked**, in a society like ours, **to** the general functioning of an apparatus of **truth**. In other words, the intellectual has a three-fold specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty-bourgeois in the service of capitalism or ‘organic’ intellectual of the proletariat); that of his conditions of life and work, linked to his condition as an intellectual (his field of research, his place in a laboratory, and political and economy demands to which he submits of against which he rebels, in the university, the hospital, etc.); lastly, the specificity of the politics of truths in our societies. And **it’s with this** last **factor that [their]** his **position can take on** a general **significance** and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectorial. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society. **There is a battle** ‘for truth,’ or at least ‘**around truth’** – it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf’ of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth **and the** economic and political **role it plays**. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of ‘science’ and ‘ideology’, but in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘power’. And thus the question of the professionalization of intellectuals and the division between intellectual and manual labour can be envisaged in a new way. All this must seem very confused and uncertain. Uncertain indeed, and what I am saying here is above all to be taken as a hypothesis. In order for it to be a little less confused, however, I would like to put forward a few ‘propositions’ – not firm assertions, but simply suggestions to be further tested and explained. **‘Truth’ is** to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is **linked** in a circular relation **with** system of **powers which** produces and **sustain** it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. **A regime** of truth. This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it’s this same regime **which [is], subject to** certain **modifications**, operates in the socialists countries (I leave open here the question of China, about which I know little). **The** essential political problem for the **intellectual** **is not to criticize** the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or **to ensure that his own** scientific **practice** is accompanied by a correct ideology, **but** **that of ascertaining the possibility of** constitution a **new** politics of **truth. The problem is** not changing people’s consciousness’s – or what’s in their heads – but **the** political, economic, institutional regime of the **production of truth**. **It’s** not **a matter** of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but **of detaching the power of truth from** the forms of **hegemony**, social economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.

Foucault explains that the intellectual has the obligation to ascertain the possibility of new truth since the intellectual is the agent that is specifically linked to the function of truth and the role it plays. This also implies that education is always more important than fairness since such axiomatic principles are meaningless and powerless until they are first critiqued and reterritorialized.

This is especially true in the context of a critical education, which has the role of underpinning totalizing judgments, such as fairness. Such judgments undermine thought and normative argumentation entirely because it is only through a combat of judgment that our thought gains meaning and purpose. **Deleuze** explains,

Combat is not a judgment of God, but the way to have done with God and with judgment. **No one develops through** **judgment, but through a combat that implies no judgment**. Existence and judgment seem to be opposed on five points: cruelty versus infinite torture, sleep or intoxication versus the dream, vitality versus organization, the will to power versus a will to dominate, combat versus war. What disturbed us was that in renouncing judgment we had the impression of depriving ourselves of any means of distinguishing between existing beings, between modes of existence, as if everything were now of equal value. But is it not rather **[J]udgment** that **presupposes preexisting criteria** (higher values), criteria that preexist for all time (to the infinity of time), **so** **that it can neither apprehend what is new** in an existing being, **nor** even **sense** **the creation of a mode of existence?** Such a mode is created vitally, through combat, in the insomnia of sleep, and not without a certain cruelty toward itself: nothing of all this is the result of judgment. **Judgment prevents the emergence of any new modes of existence. For** the latter **creates itself through its own forces**, that is, through the forces it is able to harness, **and is valid in and of itself** inasmuch as it brings the new combination into existence. Herein, perhaps, lies the secret: to bring into existence and not to judge. If **it so disgusting to judge**, it is **not because everything is of equal value, but** on the contrary **because what has value can be** made or **distinguished only by defying judgment. What expert judgment, in art, could ever bear on the work to come?**  It is not a question of judging other existing beings, but of sensing whether they agree or disagree with us, that is, whether they bring forces to us, or whether they return us to the miseries of war, to the poverty of thee dream, to the rigors of organization. As Spinoza had said, it is a problem of love and hate and not judgment; “my soul and body are one...What my soul loves, I love. What my soul hates, I hate...All the subtle sympathizing’s of the incalculable soul, from the bitterest that to passionate love.” This is not subjectivism, since to pose the problem in terms of force, and not in other terms, already surpasses all subjectivity.

Deleuze explains that avoiding judgments through combat, or a confrontation of judgment, is epistemologically key because it is only through the act of defying judgment that we see which truths have meaning and are not merely self-righteous. This implies that the voter is for critical education, which is the form of education that combats previously static normative truths; this is distinct from traditional education voters because it redefines the type of education that is most valuable. However, even if they beat back these arguments education should still be prioritized over fairness because schools fund debate for its educational value, which means absent education, debate will die as an activity; fairness, on the other hand, is subjective and highly dependent on context and situation, which makes it an unstable metric for evaluating the round. Finally, Deleuze and Foucault imply that that the judge must drop the debater since the role of the intellectual, i.e., the judge, is to deconstruct oppressive truth. Because the aff prevented such a process from occurring by eliminating my critique ground, they ought to lose. But, drop the debater either way because it is the only sufficient deterrent for future abuse.

## 2NR Schlag Overview

This theory is distinct from other forms of theory because it is a means of expanding our plane of thought, and our ability to express our ideas creatively in the debate space, unlike other types of theory shells that intend to restrict it by labeling it as “unfair” or “uneducational.” However, the judge must reject such banking concepts because they are merely self-righteous constructs that attempt to restrict and totalize our thought – this also means reject fairness voters in favor of the 1NC. **Schlag** explains,

**Normative** legal **thought** **cannot** **wait** **to** enlist epistemology, semiotics, social theory or any other enterprise in its own ethical-moral argument structures about the right, the good, the useful, the efficient (or any of their doctrinally crystallized derivatives). It cannot wait to **reduce** world views, attitudes, demonstrations, provocations, and **thought itself, to norms**. In short, **it cannot wait to tell you**(or somebody else) **what to do**. In fact, **normative** legal **thought** is so much in a hurry that it **will tell you what to do even** **though** there is not the slightest chance that **you [can’t]** might actually be in a position to **do it.** For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle into effect, or to restructure the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? “In the future, we should ….” When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? **Normative** legal **thought doesn’t** **seem** overly **concerned** **with** such worldly **questions about the character** and the effectiveness **of its own discourse**. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned [with] that for all practical purposes, **its only consumers are**legal academics and perhaps a few law students – persons who are virtually **never in a position to put** any of **its** wonderful normative **advice into effect.** If there’s no one in charge at the other end of the line, why then is normative legal thought in such a hurry to get its message across? And why, particularly, is it always in such a hurry to repeat the same old boring moves? There is an edge to these questions. And the edge comes in part from our implicit assumption that normative legal thought is a kind of that and that, as thought, it is in control of its own situation, its form, its own rhetoric. But it isn’t so. If **normative** legal **thought** keeps repeating itself, and if it **is incapable of understanding challenges to its own**intellectual **authority**, that is because **it is** not simply or even fundamentally a kind of thought. Normative legal thought is in **part a routine**– our routine. It is the highly repetitive, cognitively entrenched, institutionally sanctioned, and politically enforced routine of the legal academy – **a routine that silently produces our thoughts** and keeps our work channeled within the same old cognitive and rhetorical matrices. Like most routines, **it has been so well internalized that we repeat it** automatically, **without thinking**. Schlag, Pierre. 1999. Normativity and the Politics of Form. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol 139 No. 4. pp 801-932.

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